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ABSTRACT
This paper provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of the impact of pri
vate HIV information on sexual activity showing how the private information
provided by a public testing program would change the allocation of informa
tion generated in absence of the program. The theoretical analysis implies that
mainly low-risk HIV-positive and high-risk HIV-negative individuals, which are
small groups by definition, will respond to a public testing program, and that
the total response to such a program may be small due to the offsetting effects
that are masked by aggregating across such risk groups. The result follows from
the key insight of our model, that the information 'treatment' varies with the
prior probability of infection held by the respondent, thus necessitating disaggre
gation by categorical characterizations of these unobservable prior probabilities
in order to interpret the evidence on these information interventions. We ad
dress these implications empirically using a longitudinal survey that imitated a
public HIV testing program by actually administering an HIV test as part of
the survey as well as recording the respondent's prior knowledge of HIV status,
and his or her sexual practices before and after this information intervention.
Using this direct evidence on the trade effects of endowing traders with private
information, we are able to directly assess the longitudinal impact of such a
1 Boozer is at the Department of Economics, Yale
University, 27 Hillhouse Avenue, New
Haven, CT, 06520. Philipson is at the Department of Economics, University of Chicago,
1126 East 59th Street, Chicago, IL, 60637. We are thankful to Joseph Catania and Stephen
Hu.lley at the AIDS Prevention Center at UCSF for provision of the SFHHS data. We thank
David Card, David Cutler, Michael Kremer, Steve Pischke, Paul'Schultz, Edward Vytlacil,
and seminar participants at Princeton, Yale, MIT/Harvard Labor Workshop, The Federal
'lrade Commission, The World Bank, and the 1994 Health Economics Conference at Penn for
helpful comments. None of these individuals should be implicated in the interpretations or
shortcomings of this work. This work was partly carried out while Philipson was a visitor at
Yale University. Philipson acknowledges financial support from NSF Grant SBR 9409917.

public information intervention. Consistent with the theoretical discussion, we
find that inducing private information increased the volume of sexual contact
by 16 percent for high-risk HIV-negative respondents and had little effect on
high-risk HIV-positives. We conclude by discussing the general implications our
analysis has for empirical work that attempts to directly sample information and
information changes in assessing theoretical models of informational effects on
market equilibria.
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Introduction

Information, and in particular the distribution of information amongst agents
in a given market, plays a vital role in many models of economic activity. For
example, many studies of credit markets argue that information asymmetries
by borrowers and lenders reduce the volume of credit exchanged. Similarly,
more than half the federal budget, in terms of Medicare health insurance and
Social Security savings, is frequently argued to be due to the trade barriers that
information asymmetries impose. Yet, it is difficult to directly observe or mea
sure the extent and consequences of information asymmetries in decentralized
markets. Instead, in empirical assessments of models of asymmetric information
we often infer the distribution of information in a market from the nature of
prices and/or quantities traded, or by construction of proxies for information
by subgroups of traders without the information itself actually being observed. 2
The pattern of information in the market is then recovered from a model of
the information distribution given prices and/or quantities or the outcomes of
interest.3 In other empirical studies of economic models of information, proxies
2

In the asymmetric information auctions literature concerning oil exploration drainage

leases (e.g. Hendricks and Porter (1986}) rather tight arguments can be made that firms
with tracts adjacent to the tract up for auction have access to seismological data that the
"outside" firms do not have. However, the degree to which an inside firm's information set is a
finer partition than the outside firm's is not measurable. Nor does the pattern of information
change in known or observable ways over these sample periods.
3 For example,

in the literature on asymmetric information models of strikes, (e.g. Kennan

and Wilson (1988) and Card (1990)) the joint distribution of the endogeneous outcomes of

2

for information (usually subgroupings of the market traders which are assumed
to have better or worse access to the information under question) are used, but
again, the information itself is not actually observed. 4 Our objective here is
to consider the demand side of a market for information regarding individuals'
HIV statuses, and how changes in that information relate to changes in sexual
behavior. We want to make clear that we are not considering a market for sex
ual activity. The unique feature of our study of the impact of information in
an economic model is that for a portion of the participants in our data, their
information (regarding their HIV status) is changing in a known and quantifi
able way. We are thus in a position to evlauate clearly a behavioral response to
a change in an individual's information set that has changed during the course
of the survey (in this case, the outcome we study is the change over the survey
in the number of sexual partners before and after the individuals' information
sets have changed).
The central policy issue we study, the role ofinformational interventions such
as public testing programs in altering sexual practices of a population so as to
help curtail the spread of HIV, clearly necessitates the development of a model of
the behavioral response to a change in information. HIV, the causative agent of
wage settlements, stirke durations and incidence are studied to infer something about the

degree of asymmetric information of the profitability of the firm.
•1n the asymmetric information strikes literature, Tracy (1986,1987) uses the ob.served ezpoat stock market valuation of the firm to proxy for the union's ez-11nte uncertainity about
the firm's profitability.

3

AIDS, is an asymptomatic disease such that those infected cannot be discerned
from those not infected. Nor is infection evident to an individual unless he or
she has a blood test to determine his or her infection status. Furthermore, HIV
is not a disease that is spread through the air or transmitted by chance (at least
in the bulk of transmissions) such as measles, but is spread by actions largely
dictated by choice. 5 Indeed, many of the public health proposals aimed at try
ing to curb the spread of HIV are aimed at changing transmissive behavior by
altering the nature of information about the disease: through education about
the prevalence of HIV and the means by which it is transmitted, and by public
testing programs aimed at providing information on HIV status to individuals
(and in more radical proposals, to their partners) so that they may take actions
to limit exposing others to the disease.- But standard epidemiological models
of disease transmission, since they do not provide a model of the behavioral
response to a change in information, provide no means for evlauating the effi
cacy of these proposals. This is because the allocation of information regarding
disease status does not matter for the progression of diseases such as HIV in
so far as these models are concerned. 6 This paper provides a theoretical and
empirical analysis of the impact of private HIV information on sexual activity.
We do so by first considering the nature of the demand for information about
·-

HIV, so as to understand who would be affected by a public testing program.
~See the general diSCUBSion in Bloom and Carliner (1988), Bloom and Glied (1991), and
Philipson and Posner (1993) among others.
11 See

Anderson and May (1991) and the references therein.
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We find that the aggregate response to the information change is close to
zero, suggesting little if any behavioral elasticity with respect to a change in an
individual's information set. However, the model we construct for an individ
ual level demand for information predicts exactly this result, but it is perfectly
consistent with a non-zero individual level elasticity with respect to an infor
mation change. The aggregate net effect of zero comes from aggregating across
sub-populations with different prior beliefs, and thus differing responses to the
information learned through the survey. When we disaggregate our results by
discrete characterizations of the prior beliefs, such as High and Low risk individ
uals, we find that those individuals who 'learn a lot' from the survey, i.e. those
individuals whose posterior beliefs of infection change a lot upon having their
HIV status revealed to them relative to their prior beliefs of infection, do in fact
respond in a significant way to that information change. A somewhat surprising
result of this is that not all individuals who learn they are HIV positive change
their behavior (in this case, their number of sexual partners) in a significant
way. Instead only those individuals who thought they were HIV negative, but
who learned instead they were HIV positive, appeared to change their number of
sexual partners significantly ( although this particular group was so small that a
definitive statistical claim cannot be made). Another somewhat surprising find
ing, although completely consistent with the model we propose, is that those
individuals who thought they were HIV positive, but who learned through the
survey they were HIV negative, increase their number of sexual partners as a
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result of this information. Somewhat perversely, in the face of a growing HIV
epidemic, such an effect of increased sexual contact could potentially enhance
the spread ofHIV. 7 In any event, the changes in behavior as a result of this sort
of 'information intervention', which emulates a publicly subsidized HIV testing
program, indicate that the benefits to a public testing program would be few if
any.
The paper may be outlined as follows. Section 2 studies the determinants
of the private demand for HIV-testing and the incremental effect that a public
testing program would have on that demand. We show that the private demand
is a non-monotonic function of the prior belief of infection, corresponding to the
fraction of a group that is infected, and therefore only those people who are most
unsure demand the information generated by a test. This has the implication
that a public testing program affects mostly the extreme risk groups, consisting
of low- and high-risk traders. A consequence of this is that only high-risk HIV
negative traders and low-risk HIV-positive traders gain any substantial amount
of information from the public testing program, in the sense that the posterior
belief after testing is altered compared to the prior belief before testing. If
7

We should emphasize however, the goal in our paper is not to analyze the effects of a

.public testing program on the qreatl of HIV. As Michael Kremer bas pointed out to us,
disease dynamics can be driven by the behavior o( only a very few infected individuals having
a lot of sexual contact. To the extent this occurs in our data, if our intent were to study
disease dynamics, we would want to look at effects other than just mean treatment effects of
learning, but consider effects at different quantiles.
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behavior is information elastic, the greatest response to the public information
intervention is therefore in these groups, which are small by definition.
Section 3 provides an empirical examination of these implications. We first
describe the dataset, the San Francisco llome Health Study (SFIIIIS), which is
unique relative to many economic datasets used to empirically study economic
models of information because it includes direct measures on private information
(in the crude sense that we know if the respondent does or does not know his
or her HIV status before the start of the survey) and behavior. Using these
data, we estimate that the effect of a public program endowing individuals
with private HIV information is small, in terms of the effect on the quantity
of sexual trades {number of partners). The survey itself mimics a subsidized
public testing program by performing blood tests on the respondents through
the survey, in addition to asking about private knowledge of HIV infection
status and sexual behavior, both before and after this information intervention.
The idea is that the availability of HIV testing conducted by the survey was
devised independentiy of the private demand for HIV testing (in that the survey
frame was designed independently of the demand for HIV tests). Using this
survey we are able to test in a direct manner (by observing an intervention of
an information 'dosage' through the survey) the implications discussed in the
theoretical analysis, as well as the implicit trade effects of endowment of private
(and so potentially asymmetric) information that such a program involves.
Consistent with the theoretical model outlined above, we find that nega-

7

tive high-risk individuals are the people most responsive to the public testing
mimicked by the survey (only a negligible proportion of the sample falls in the
low-risk group that learn through the survey they ;re HIV positive, as a. re-

¥
suit we cannot conclude anything with regard to the behavioral response of this
group).
Since we lack a randomized design of the group who is affected by the testing
through the survey, we rely on a non-random treatment and control methodology
to estimate the effects of the 'information intervention' presented by the HIV
testing conducted through the survey. Since the lack of pure randomization
suggests possibilities of selection bias, we present results based on two different
control groups. Both control groups have the property that neither of them
should be affected by the 'treatment' of the HIV test administered through
the survey. The first control group consists of the individuals who have prior
knowledge of their HIV status be/ore the first wave of the survey, but who choose
to test through the survey as well. Given that they have prior knowledge of their
HIV status, they would not be affected by the treatment administered through
the survey. However, as this group is not selected at random, heterogeneity
arguments could be made that this 'safe sex' group (given their desire for double
testing) would have too strong of a trend towards safer sexual practices, and
thus drive some of our results for that reason. Thus, we also make use of a
second control group, which would be an ideal counterfactual group were it
randomly selected (i.e. if the testing component of the survey were denied to

8

a randomly chosen portion of the respondents). This control group consists of
those respondents who completed the questionnaire portion of the survey, but
refused to take the blood test administered as part of the Wave I survey. Thus,
for this group we have the demographic information (including their sexual
orientation}, but do not know their HIV status. While it is certainly possible
that both control groups will yield results biased in the same way due to their
non-random selection, we find it to be strongly suggestive of the robustness of
our results in that the results based on both control groups are qualitatively
and quantitatively similar (although not as statistically significant in the latter
case).
Because there has been increased protection over time with the rise of the
AIDS epidemic,8 and because the information intervention is not the only factor
leading to a change in sexual contacts over the time span of our survey, we use
those respondents who tested before the survey as a_ control group for those
who learned their HIV status through the survey. In addition, since this control
group is not derived through any randomization device, we construct a second
control group ofthose respondents who filled out the questionairre portion of the
survey, but who refused the HIV test component. Thus, although high-risk re
spondents who learn through the survey that they are HIV-positive dropped ap
proximately 0.9 of a partner after the information intervention (compared with
before the intervention), those high-risk respondents who had prior knowledge
8 See

Ahituv, Hotz, and Philipson {1993).
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of being HIV positive dropped roughly half this much (0.45 of a partner), with
the statistical difference between these two point estimates being neglible. This
suggests no behavioral effect of learning that one is HIV-positive in the high-risk
group-a finding consistent with the theoretical model described above. Also
as predicted, those high-risk individuals who learned they were HIV-negative
contrary to their prior beliefs about their infection status experienced a one
tenth of a partner, relative to a significantly negative trend (-0.7 of a partner)
in the change in the number of partners for those who tested negative before
the survey. 9
These findings have potentially important implications for the effects of pub
lic testing programs on the growth of the HIV epidemic. If high-risk groups are
the target of testing programs, then such programs appear to do little in the
way of altering their behavior. Instead, the largest response to information we
observe in our data comes from those who actually learn something-the posi
tive low-risk and negative high-risk individuals. Indeed, the high-risk negatives
subsequently engage in sexual intercourse with a relatively greater number of
partners, potentially placing them at greater risk of becoming infected. The
model suggests, and the empirical results corroborate, that a public testing pro
gram can potentially have unintended effects. The main substantive conclusion
from these close-to-ideal data, therefore, is that public HIV testing programs
9 However,

the number of negative high-risk individuals and positive low-risk individuals is

small by definition, so the standard errors are relatively larger•.
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appear to have little benefit, if any, in reducing the risk of further infections for
populations similar to this one from San Francisco.
We conclude this paper with a discussion of the shortcomings of our data,
and the methodological issues that are generalizable to other studies of demand
for information, information asymmetries, and their resultant impact on quan
tities of goods traded in an implicit or explicit market. Much of the previous
empirical work

OJ)

models of information and their implications for trade effects

has been done in the context of the market inefficiencies arising from the pres
ence of asymmetric information between traders (see e.g. Bond ( 1982), Genesove
(1993), and Foster and Rosenszweig (1994)). The key difference of our paper,
beyond its substantive focus on AIDS, is that our data include direct measures
of how individuals' information sets are changing for our portion of our data.
Given the large theoretical literature on models of information and its sizable
impact on ec~nomic thought (notably the implications of trade reductions and
market inefficiencies that arise from models of asymmetric information), 10 we
are hopeful that future research efforts in this area will attempt direct sampling
of the information at the heart of these models, as opposed to inferring its exis
tence by looking at patterns of prices and quantities traded. In the conclusion,
we discuss the advantages of having direct measures on information, and the
degree to which some of the lessons we have learned in this particular study on
the demand for information can be carried over to markets where the measure
10 See

eg. Akerlof (1970) and the literature that followed it.
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of information changes cannot be as precise as an HIV test. We consider as
well situations where the interest is on studies of asymmetric information, and
so the data and survey requirements are greater than in our study. We point
out some potential pitfalls that direct survey methods may have on the study of
such settings. We also acknowledge that while we do have direct measures as to
how the information sets of the sample respondents is changing longitudinally
through the survey, that their response to that 'information treatment' depends
upon their unobservable prior probability of infection. Future studies may wish
to try to directly sample these priors or at the very least recognize their impact
on the effects of information treatments.

2

Private vs. Public Demand for Information

This section discusses a model of the private demand for testing and the incre
mental belief and trade effects of a public testing program. We formulate the
model solely as an individual demand for testing, and set aside for now the issue
of behavior as arising from a joint bargaining problem for a couple. 11 Consider
11 We

have chosen this route based on the data available to us. Earlier work with a modelling

approach that incorporated a setting of imperfect information as to the partner's beliefs of
the respondent's HIV status required data on how those partner beliefs changed with respect
a change in the respondent's knowledge of his or her own HIV status. Since we lacked those
data, the only feature of this richer model we could address with our data was whether the
findings were consistent with a pooling or seperating equilibrium of the model. We intend

the model presented here to be thought of as representing the separating equilibrium of this
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an individual who has a prior belief of infection that may be altered through

= {0, 1},
Let the set Y = {Yo, Yi}

the information provided by a test. Denote the health states by H
where 0 indicates not infected and 1 indicates infected.

denote the set offeasible sexual behaviors, where the subscripts denote the most
preferred behavior when the infection statuses are known with certainty, so that
in the case of HIV, Yo may denote no sexual contact or partners, and Y1 may in
dicate engaging in sexual contact with a partner. Denote the feasible set of test
results by T

= {0, 1} for negative and positive tests.

Let the health-dependent

utility function be denoted U(y, h), indicating the utility of the individual under
health state h E H behaving according to

y

E Y, where, ceteris paribus, bet

ter health and unprotected behavior are preferred (i.e., U(y, 0)

U(yo, h) > U(y1, h)). If P(H = h, T

> U(y, 1)

and

=t) denotes the probability of the individ

ual being of health status h and receiving the test result t, then the prior belief
of infection is denoted p

= P(H = 1), and the belief conditional on a positive

and negative test is denoted Pl= P(H

= llT = 1) and po= P(H = llT = 0)

respectiveiy. Given any prior beiief of infection p the expected utility of a given
behavior is

V[y,p]

=pU(y, 1) + (1- p)U(y, 0).

If y(p) denotes the most preferred behavior under infection belief p, it is easily
shown to involve protection if and only if the risk is higher than a given threshold
richer model, or where there is complete altruism between partners, so no bargaining problem
is present.
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level

where p is the cutoff-belief above which an individual will not engage in trans
missive behavior defined by V(y1 , p]

= V[y

0,

p]. In the special case of perfect

knowledge of infection status, the decision rule reduces to choosing transmissive
behavior when negative and avoidance behavior when positive, that is, Yo when
p

= 0 and y1 when p = 1.

An individual's expected utility without a test is

given by

VN

=V[y(p),p] = pU(y(p), 1) + (1- p)U(y(p), 0).

Her expected utility after testing positive is
V(y(p1),pi]

= p1U(y(pi), 1) + (1- P1)U(y(pi), 0),

and after testing negative
V[y(po),po]

=poU(y(po), 1) + (1- Po)U(y(po), 0).

Thus, at the time of testing, taking into account the results of testing positive
or negative, the expected utility of testing is

The value ofinformation comes from the value to the individual of behavioral
change upon the result of the test. It is straightforward to show that the net
benefit of testing satisfies

14

VT - VN
{ · VT - VN

= p[U(y1, 1)- U(yo, 1)]
= (l -

p<p

p)[U(yo, 0)- U(y1, 0)] p ~ p.

This may be explained as follows. The individual chooses transmissive behavior when negative and avoidance behavior when positive. If he does not
test, he engages in transmissive behavior if he believes he is likely to be neg
ative, p < p. If he tests, he engages in transmissive behavior only if he tests
negative. Therefore, the chance that he is doing the wrong thing when not
testing is the probability of being positive, p, and the benefit of switching to
avoidance behavior upon testing positive is U(yi, 1) - U(y0 , 1). Similarly, the
chance of doing the wrong thing when believing himself to be at high-risk is the
chance of being negative, (1 - p), and the benefit of switching behavior upon
a negative test result equals U(yo, 0) - U(y1, 0). In summary, the benefit to
the individual of screening comes from the expected benefit to the individual of
behavioral change.
The private sector demand for screening comes at a cost denoted C, in
cluding, in addition to the direct price of testing, the time devoted to seeing
the doctor (shoe-leather cost) or aversion toward the test itself (psychic costs).
Screening is demanded if the value of information offsets this cost,

Figure 1 illustrates the benefit and costs of screening and how the individual's
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prior belief about infection determines the demand for testing. 12

[FIGURE 1 INSERTED HERE]
The benefit of screening is peak-shaped and the cost of screening is flat
with respect to the individual's perceived probability of infection. This has
the implication that the prior has a non-monotonic effect on the demand for
a screening. Those individuals with subjective probabilities near the middle
of this diagram (i.e., where the peak of the benefit schedule exceeds the cost)
demand a private screening. Hence, it is individuals in the middle who get
tested privately because those are the ones most unsure about their infection
status, and thus they are the most unsure about the correctness of their behavior
without screening. People who are more sure of their infection status are more
sure that they are doing the right thing, Y1 if H

= 1 and Yo if H = 0, and hence

have a lower demand for testing. In the special case of being sure about one's
infection status before the test, there is obviously zero demand for testing.
12 Gertler,

Sturm, and Davidson (1995) coDSider a model of the demand for supplemental

Medicare insurance in which the benefit schedule is similar to ours. They construct a struc
tural model in which inlonnation shilts both the mean and the variance of the expected ben
efits distribution. Their inlonnation index is a constructed proXY measuring survey response
knowledge of Medicare benefits, before and after an 'information intervention' consisting of
educational workshops provided to respondents on their Medicare benefits.
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2.1

The Effects of Public Screening

In Figure 1, the demand for private screening comes from individuals in the
range between the lower and upper bounds [L,U], which represents those in
dividuals who are more unsure of their infection status. The lower and upper
bounds can be shown to satisfy

L = C/[U(Yi, 1)- U(yo, 1)] & U = 1- C/[U(yo, 0)- U(yi, O)].
The effects of a public screening program that subsidizes testing by an amount
s

may therefore be represented by the interval [La, U8 ] 2 [L, U] corresponding

to the beliefs of testers under the reduced testing costs C - s of the program.
We label this (lower) cost of subsidized testing as C., and it is shown in Figure
1. As the cost of screening is made smaller by such a program, the set of

people affected by a public screening program is comprised more and more of
those with relatively more extreme priors, close to O or very close to 1. In the
extreme case of mandatory testing or a full subsidy, s = C, everyone tests,
so that [Ls, U.] = [O, 1]. To consider the effect that a public screening has on
behavior, suppose the population is specified by a distribution function F(p)
over prior probabilities of infection. We assume that an individual's subjective
belief of infection corresponds to the objective frequency (i.e. prevalence), 13 in
his risk group, so that the value F(p) may also be interpreted as the fraction of
13 By

assuming that p percent ofindividuals who have subjective beliefs p are indeed infected,

we ignore the important effects of mandatory screening which occur under misperceptious of
risk group membership.
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individuals in risk groups with prevalence lower than p.
The behavioral effect il of the program is then given by the prior specific
effects il(p) aggregated up, as in
il

[ .

=

J

il(p)dF(p)

=

[y(p) - yi]p + [y(p) - Yo](l - p)dF(p) =

j[L.,L]u[U,U,]

[y(p) - Yo](l - p)dF(p).
[y(p) - Yi]pdF(p) + [
[
lcu,u.J
lcL.,LJ
This aggregate effect may be interpreted as follows. Since a public screening
program only impacts those individuals who do not test privately, the program
has an effect only on those individuals who do not test and who are doing the
wrong thing (i.e., individuals engaging in transmissive behavior when positive
and avoidance behavior when negative). Thus, the program only affects negative
high-risk individuals (in [U, U,]) and positive low-risk individuals (in [L,, L]).
The first term in the last equation therefore represents the behavioral change of
positive individuals who do not demand a test privately. These individuals' low
belief of infection induces them to engage in transmissive behavior, and the test
induces p percent of each risk class to alter their behavior. The second term
represents the behavioral change of negative individuals who do not demand a
test privately. These individuals' high belief of infection induces them to engage
in avoidance behavior, and the test induces 1- p percent of each risk class to
18

alter their behavior. The behavioral change thus comes from individuals who are
not 'doing the right thing,' consisting of low-risk positives who do not protect
and high-risk negatives who do protect.
We illustrate in Figure 2 the effects of testing for the continuum of the prior
beliefs of infection. This figure is drawn under the assumption that the change
in behavior is binary (eg. adopt protective behavior if one learns he positive,
and adopt transmissive behavior if one learns he is negative). In our context,
where we focus on the particular behavioral variable of the number of sexual
partners, we may think of this binary behavioral change as adding or dropping a
partner. This figure, as is the case with Figure 1, is drawn under the assumption
of symmetry. If individuals are distributed with beliefs uniformly on [0, l], then
it is visually clear from the diagram that the aggregate effect will be exactly
0, even though individuals are information elastic. Under the more realistic
assumption that individuals are distributed with disproportionate mass near
p

= 0, and allowing for non-binary responses, the aggregate response may not

be exactly 0, but the diagram does indicate how aggregate effects near 0 are
consistent with underlying behavioral responses that are information elastic. 14
HJn order to make the exposition of the model clear, we have focused on the case of
symmetry, (i.e. the benefit schedule peaks at 0.5, the change in behavior when an individual
learns she is positive is of the same magnitude (but opposite sign) as when she learns she
_is negative, etc.), although the fundamental points of the model (individual- level behavior
which is information elastic consistent with small aggregate effects of testing, opposite signs
of the change in behavior for low-risk positives and high-risk negatives, essentially O changes
for the other groups, etc.) remain unchanged.

19

[FIGURE 2 INSERTED HERE)
For a partially subsidized public testing program (i.e. the subsidy level
s

lying in the interval (0, C) ), the figure depicts the increase or decrease in

protection induced by the program as a function of the risk level. Note for
those individuals with prior beliefs p lying in the intervals [O, L.,], [L, U] and

[U.,, lJ there is no effect on behavior of the public testing program. This is
because for the group of people with p in [L, U] there is a private demand for
the test before the start of the survey. Whereas for those people with p in either
[O, L.,] or [U.,, 1] there is no demand for a test even with the lower, subsidized
cost of testing under the survey. We make use of these 'non-affected' groups to
construct appropriate control groups which we discuss in Section 3 below. Thus
only for those people with p in either [L.,, LJ ('low-risk' individuals) or [U, U.,J
('high-risk' individuals) is there a change in behavior induced by the program.
Among the low-risk individuals there is an increase in protection made up of
a fraction p of positives whose protection rises by one unit, y(p) - Yi
that the risk-specific effect is ~(p)

= (p)l + (1 -

p)O

= p.

= 1, so

Among the high-

risk individuals there is a decrease in protection made up of a fraction 1 - p of
· negatives whose protection falls by one unit, y(p) - Yo = -1, so that the risk
specific effect is a(p)

= (p)0 + (1 -

p)(-1)

=p -

1. The size of the trapezoid

Based on our work below, we would expect the peak of the benefit schedule to lie near 0.04
(the mean HIV prevalence in our data), and the drop in the number of partners Crom learning
positive to be somewhat larger in magnitude terms (in terms of just point estimates) than the
increase in the number of partners Crom learning negative.
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•

above the abscissa minus the size of that below it makes up the overall effect
d. The trapezoid to the left is the aggregate increase in protection by low-risk

positives, and the trapezoid to the right is the aggregate reduction of protection
by high-risk negatives.
Figure 2 illustrates several points of interest. The sign of the effect in pro
tection is different, dependent on whether a non-demander is high- or low-risk.
Consequently, the unconditional effect d, aggregating up over all risk classes,
may be close to zero if the sizes of the two trapezoids in the figure are ap
proximately equal. 15 Furthermore, the change in behavior is close to zero for
high-risk positives and low-risk negatives since they gain little information from
getting a test result which confirms their prior beliefs. The individuals who learn
something from the public program, a prerequisite for any behavioral effect, are
those whose test results do not coincide with their priors: high-risk negatives
and low-risk positives.

3

Empirical Analysis

This section uses the theoretical model presented in Section 2 above to aid in
the construction of appropriate control groups by which we can estimate the
behavioral effects of a public testing program using a longitudinal dataset on
sexual behavior. The dataset's key feature is that it samples directly whether
15 For

example, if beliefs are uniform and losses from misbehaving are symmetric, then the

aggregate change in behavior ~ is exactly zero.
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or not the respondents have tested previously for HIV. Thus, for a portion
of the sample (those who have not tested previously, but who choose to be
tested through the survey), their information sets are changing in a known and
observable fashion. This feature stands in contrast to previous empirical studies
of the trade effects of incomplete information, in that we have direct data on a
change in information.

3.1

The Dataset

The dataset we used comes from the San Francisco Home Health Study (SFHHS),
collected by the AIDS Prevention Center at the University of California at San
· Francisco (UCSF). 16 The SFHHS is an epidemiological study designed to yield
data on the prevalence of AIDS and related risk factors in multi-cultural neigh
borhoods. The respondents of the baseline survey were interviewed to obtain
information about their behavior, attitudes, and beliefs relevant to AIDS. The
sampling frame was defined to be unmarried males and females, ages 20-44, who
were also residents in San Francisco census tracts with substantial proportions
of blacks and Hispanics (those geographically adjacent to the Castro District).
The survey sample was a stratified two-stage sample of all households within the
16 For

details of the sample design, see 'Sampling Methods and Wave 1 Field Results of the

San Francisco Home Health Study,' Survey Research Center Technical Report, University of
California, Berkeley (the initial project site of the SFHHS). See also the paper by Fullilove et

al (1992) which compares the sampled population to the population covered by the sampling
frame, using Census tract data.
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designated census tracts. All eligible persons in each selected housing unit were
taken into the sample. Interviewing for the baseline survey began in April 1988
and finished in July 1989, and interviewing for the second wave was initiated
one year later. For details of the sample, particularly with regard to the target
population and the specific census tracts within the frame, see Fullilove et al.
(1992).
The summary statistics for the types of respondents in our constructed sam
ple are given in Table 1 below. Since our sample is representative of a region of
higher risk than the US as a whole, we offer the reader a comparison of some of
the variables in our data with those for the entire US. To that end, we report
where possible the means for comparable variables from the National Health
and Social Life Survey (NHSLS) conducted by National Opinion Research Cen
ter (NORC) at the University of Chicago (see Laumann et al. (1994)), which
is intended to be a nationally representative sample of sexual attitudes and
practices.
TABLE 1 INSERTED HERE
The SFHHS obtained very detailed information from these respondents from
the standpoint of evaluating the trade effects of incomplete information. In
particular, the measures were far more detailed than those of previous empirical
studies of incomplete information, most importantly in that they include direct
measures on the respondents' beliefs. The observables of interest in the SFHHS
include the sexual (disease transmissive) activity of the respondent with the
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respondent's partner(s), the respondent's knowledge of the HIV status of his
or her own self and partner(s), and the actual lIIV status of the respondent as
measured by blood samples taken as part of the survey. 17 The survey slightly
undersampled males relative to the US population estimates, and 14 percent of
the sample self-reported their sexual orientation as homosexual, defined here as
those respondents with a partner of the same gender, indicating a large degree
of over-representation of homosexuals in our sampled population relative to the
US population. However, we present results largely broken down along this line
of stratification, so this over-sampling is not of concern in our context. Indeed,
17The

survey questions relating to the respondent's knowledge of his or her own HIV status

are the following two questions: 1. Have you ever had your blood tested for infection with the
AIDS virus? 2. (conditional on answering 'yes' to Question 1) Do you know what the result(s)
of your test(s) (was/were), or didn't you find out your result(s)? Interestingly, while the survey
asked whether the respondent knew his or her HIV status, they did not ask what that status
was through the aurvey inatrument. Thus, there exists the possibility of contamination of this
control group (althouglI we present results below based on a second control group for whom
this source of bias should not be present). In particular, some of those who knew ,it .some

point in the p46t they were HIV negative, but who tested positive througlI the survey (and
this is the first time they learn this), we would classify in the group Know HIV positive, when
in fact they thought they were HIV Negative. Based on the observed prevalence of HIV in
the population, however, we estimate using our data the number of such individuals is quite
small in our control group. This 'contamination' of this particular control group would tend
to bias down the estimate of the change in the number of partners for those who we classify

as Know HIV positive, thus biasing up (toward zero) our difference-in-difference estimate of
learn HIV positive. Again, however, we point out that the likely magnitude of this bias is
quite small (certainly relative to the sampling error of these estimates).
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it is highly desirable, since homosexual respondents are such a small fraction of
the population. A total of 44 percent of the respondents were white, 25 percent
black, and 25 percent Hispanic in our sample, indicating an over-representation
of minorities. This could be a concern in our context, if race/ethnicity affects
sexual practices, apart from affecting prior probabilities of infection status.
The behavioral outcome (Y) with which we are concerned is the total number
of partners with. whom the respondent has been sexually active with in the
previous 12 months. Approximately 78 percent of the respondents had one
or more sexual partners, while 38 percent had two or more partners. The
health status variable (H) of concern is the HIV status of the respondents. The
overall HIV prevalence among respondents was 4 percent, with prevalence being
30 percent among homosexual respondents, and less than 0.8 percent among
heterosexual respondents. Finally, the combined response rate for screening
and interviewing of SFHHS respondents was 61.8 percent, which is lower than
the response rate for the NHSLS, but relatively high to comparable surveys
involving information as confidential as IIIV status and sexual behavior.
A central aspect of the SFHHS is that the survey administered to the re
spondents an HIV blood test, so a respondent learned information about his or
her own HIV status just by participating in the survey. 18 The interviews were
18 0£

the 1770 members of the Wave I sample, 254 participated in the questionnaire portion

of the survey, but refused to participate in the blood test portion of the survey. 1369 of the
1770 respondents participated in 60th the questionnaire and blood test portions of the survey.

Of these 1369, 833 learn for the first time their HIV status as a result of the survey. Of the
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conducted face-to-face in the home of the respondent, and the HIV testing took
place directly after the interview as a blood test administrated by the inter
viewer. Therefore, there was virtually no lag time between administration of
the questionnaire and the HIV test. This is important for interpreting the ret
rospective responses of behavior of the untested individuals in wave 1, since we
want to capture their sexual practices at exactly the same time that we record
their HIV result. Also, it is important that the survey was conducted in the re
spondent's household, without the initiation of the respondent, since this lowers
both the 'shoe-leather' and psychic costs of HIV testing for the respondent.
Notice that if compliance with the blood testing component of the survey
were perfect, then we could interpret the results as the effect of a mandatory
public testing program, because the sampling frame was devised independently
of the (private) demand for blood testing. This 'program effect', however, would
not coincide with the causal effect of the 'information intervention' itself, since
the pre-existing demand for information in the sampled population was not
randomly assigned conditional on the covariates. We content ourselves with
measuring the program effects of the information intervention rather than trying
to draw causal inferences from the effect of changing respondents' information
sets. Since participants may refuse the blood testing component of the survey,
we interpret this intervention as a subsidy to the cost of testing (so the cost
lowers to the line denoted by Ca in Figure 2), since the surveyors contacted
833 who learn, 814 leam they are HN Negative, and 19 leam they are HN positive.
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the respondents and went to their homes independent of their explicit demand
for a blood test. Thus, our results are perhaps more appropriately construed
as an analysis of a public subsidy program for HIV testing that operates in
conjunction with a private demand for testing, effectively reducing the costs
associated with a private demand for testing.
We construct two types of control groups which we use to 'bound' the effect
of the information intervention using the model presented in Section 2 above.
The first control group consists of those individuals who were tested for HIV
prior to the inception of the survey, and so would not be impacted by their
're-testing' through the survey. In looking at Figure 3, we see that this group is
comprised of those individuals for whom the benefit exceeded the private cost
of testing {thus leading them to test prior to the survey), and so have prior
probabilities of infection lying between L and U in Figure 3. 19
(FIGURE 3 INSERTED HERE]
The second control group we propose consists of those individuals who fill
out the questionnaire portions of the survey, but who decline the HIV blood
test component. In terms of the model we presented above, this consists of
the union of those people with prior probabilities very close to zero or one,
19 Although,

of course since testing reveals to them precisely whether they are HIV positive

l>r negative, this group may be thought of as mass points at O and 1 at the time of the survey.

In that sense then, Figure 3 may be thought of as a depiction of the 'initial conditions', but
not representative of the position of ther priors of this first control group at the time of the
survey.
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and whose benefits to testing lie below even the lower subsidized cost of testing
through the survey C,. Thus this group consists of those respondents with
prior probabilities in [O, L,J and [U,, I] who do not value testing beyond its cost
even when subsidized. The treatment group consists of those individuals for
whom the private cost of testing exceeds the benefit, but that the cost of testing
through the survey (the 'subsidized cost' C,) is lower than the benefit. Note that
this group is 'sandwiched' between these two control groups. This is important,
since the model predicts that the 'information treatment' administered to those
who learn of their HIV status through the survey will vary by their initial prior
probability of infection. Thus, if the intent of the control group is to try to 'hold
constant' the prior probability of infection, then these two control groups will do
so in different ways. In particular, the 'sandwich' effect should allow us to bound
the treatment effects. If however, the (unchanging for both control groups) prior
probability of infection is unrelated to the change in sexual behavior over the
two periods (but perhaps the level), then we would expect that the two control
groups would yield the same treatment effect.
The most unique aspect of the data we use to study the effects of the impact
of a change in a person's information set (in this case, concerning his or her HIV
status) is for those people who were uninformed of their -DIV status before the
survey (i.e., were not private demanders): by participating in the survey, their
information set is altered. This gives us the opportunity to directly observe the
impact of a change in an economic agent's information set on their resultant
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behavior in a longitudinal setting. In particular, we know before the testing
whether the agent has prior knowledge of his or her HIV status. As the dis
cussion in the previous section indicated, the aggregate behavioral effect of this
testing program is expected to be close to zero when people are symmetrically
distributed with respect to their prior beliefs of infection. As a result, and as
suggested by Figure 2, we disaggregate individuals based on what we infer their
prior (or subjective) probability of infection to be. We have experimented with
a logit model which uses a variety of demographic and sexual orientation char
acteristics of the respondents to predict their (observed) HIV status. We then
used the predicted probabilities of infection from this logit to infer whether a
respondent would think of him or herself as low or high risk (defined as above
or below the median predicted probability in the sample). However, the domi
nant risk factor in that version of the analysis was clearly sexual orientation.20
Thus for clarity and simplicity, we use instead the dominant risk factor of sex
ual orientation to proxy for the unobserved prior probability of infection, and
classify homosexuals as 'high-risk' and heterosexuals as 'low-risk' based on the
prevalence of HIV in the respective populations. 21 We present all results bro20 Jndeed,

at the time of this survey, the incidence of HIV amongst heterosexuals and ho

mosexuals in our sample is vastly different. The incidence for heterosexuals is less than 1
percent, while for homosexuals.it is 30 percent. Along no other observable dimension is this
difference in incidence so stark.
21 We should be clear in the use of th~ term 'risk' in this context. The term is meant
to imply
that, based on the o6aen,e,l prevelance rates in the sample, a given homosexual respondent is
at greater 'risk' of being HIV positive than is a given heterosexual respondent.
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ken down by this grouping since the nature of the 'information intervention'
depends upon each person's initial prior probability of infection (in addition to
what test result each person actually obtains). Breaking our sample into these
discrete high prior and low prior probability of infection subgroups gives us a 2
by 2 table of 'treatment effects'.

3.2

Empirical Results

We used the first two waves of the SFHHS (conducted 12 months apart) to con
struct data that measured the quantity (total number of partners) and quality
(extent of sexual protection given sexual contact) of sexual trades that were
taking place before and after the blood testing component of the survey. We
make use of two control groups: the first uses those respondents who had knowl
edge of their HIV status before the survey since their information sets would
be largely unchanged by the blood test administered through the survey. The
second control group we make use of is of those respondents who turned down
the blood test administered through the survey, but who fill out the question
naire portion of the survey. In both cases, we study the impact of the testing
intervention separately for Homosexual and Heterosexual respondents (proxy
ing for high and low risk of infection respectively), to avoid reporting just an
aggregate effect that would mask important differences in behavioral changes
by risk group (in particular, differences that are roughly equal and of opposite
sign).

30

TABLES 2A & 2B INSERTED HERE
In Tables 2A and 2B we present the means of the variables used in the

analysis for our 'treatment' and 2 control groups broken out by the risk classes
(Homosexual and Heterosexual) for comparison. Table 2A presents the means
for the Homosexual and Heterosexual respondents who are HIV positive (for
completeness in Tables 2A and 2B we report means for those respondents who
refuse the IIIV test, and so their IIIV status is unknown). In Rows 2 and
3 we present the means of the level of the outcome variable of interest, the
number of sexual partners in the past 12 months. In Row 4 we present the
change in the number of partners over the two waves. While the means of the

levels are quite different for Homosexuals who learn they are HIV positive than
for those who knew prior to the survey they were HIV positive, we see that
the difference in the change in the number of partners is within a standard
error of each other (-0.86 vs. -0.45). Those homosexuals who learn through
the survey they are HIV positive are slightly more likely to be white and low
education/income than those who knew this ahead of time, or those who refused
the test altogether. In addition, they are slightly younger. The differences along
observable demographic characteristics is not great, and in analysis we do below,
we control for what observable differences that do exist. Although this is not
an incredible rich set of controls for the outcome we study, we hope that the
slight differences along observable dimensions is related to no more than slight
differences along unobservable dimensions, in so far as our outcome variable in
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concerned.
TABLE 3 INSERTED HERE
In Table 3 we present the unconditional effects of providing respondents
with private information has on quantity and quality of trade, conditional on
the sexual orientation of the respondents.
The advantage of presenting the results in this format first are that the reader
can see the relevant cell sizes (given in brackets below the point estimates and the
standard errors in parentheses for each cell), and underlying point estimates. In
Tables 4 and 5 below, we reproduce these results in a regression format in which
we can readily include covariates to control for observed heterogeneity. Table
3 concerns the quantity effects (i.e., the change between the two waves in the
number of sexual partners) that learning one's HIV status through the survey
has relative to those who knew their status before the survey. The first two rows
of the table present the mean change in partners for those who learn their HIV
status through the survey. The second two rows present the mean change in the
number of partners for those who know their HIV status prior to the start of the
survey (our first control group). The bottom two rows present the 'difference-in
difference' estimates which are simply the difference in the estimates in the first
and third rows and then the second and fourth rows respectively. These effects
are the mean effect of learning one is HIV positive (row 5) or HIV negative (row
6) relative to knowing this information prior to the survey. The two columns of
the table do this exercise separately for homosexuals and heterosexuals.
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The point estimates imply that those homosexuals who learn they are HIV
positive through the survey (a total of 19 sample respondents) drop 0.86 partners
on average in the 12 months between the two surveys. Even with such a small
cell size, this estimate is significantly negative at conventional significance levels.
However, whe~ we compare this negative estimate with the mean change for
those who knew they ~ere HIV positive before the survey commenced (-0.45)
we find that the bulk of this -0.86 is potentially not due to the effect of learning
that one is HIV positive, but instead perhaps reflecting an overall trend towards
safer sexual practices for individuals in a high risk group. The difference in
these two changes (the difference-in-differences) estimate of -0.41 is well below
its standard error (t=0.63) and insignificantly different from 0, thus reflecting
that for the homosexual population the effect of learning HIV positive does
not generate a significant change in behavior. This result is consistent with
the theoretical model outlined above, in that those in the high prevalence of
HIV group (homosexuals) would have prior probabilities of infection that would
induce them to behave more like they are HIV positive than negative. Thus
learning that one is HIV positive does not tend to generate large changes in

behavior.
Similarly, if we look at the effects of learning one is HIV negative for the
homosexual group, we see smaller in magnitude negative trends in the change
of the number of partners, but we see a stronger negative trend for those ho
mosexuals who know before the survey they are HIV. Negative. AB a result, the
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difference-in-difference estimate of the effect of learning that one is HIV nega
tive for the homosexuals, we see that this knowledge is actually associ"ated with
an increase in the total number of partners (0.80 with s.e.=0.35). This rather
surprising finding can also be interpreted in the context of the model outlined
above, since for homosexuals, learning that one is HIV negative generates a
rather large change in information. If sexual behavior is elastic with respect
to information on HIV status, then we should expect to see greater changes in
behavior for the Homosexuals who learn they are HIV negative than learn they
are HIV positive. While the point estimates of the effect of learning one is HIV
positive is roughly half that of the effect of learning one is HIV negative through
the survey, the statistical significance of this latter positive estimate (t=2.3) is
substantially greatei:. This rather surprising finding can be interpreted in the
context of the model presented above.
It is important to note that the low cell frequencies in Table 3 of in the
cells where we would expect to see the most 'action' are inherent in this setup.
In particular, alternative means of classifying risk (instead of using a single
indicator of risk, but using a logit to yield predicted probabilities of infection in
a multivariate setting), will still yield relatively small numbers of observations
in these cells. However, the greatest behavioral response to the endowment
of information will most likely fall in those cells, since it is for those types of
respondents that the observed blood test result (i.e., the posterior probability

of infection) is altered most from the prior probability of infection. If priors
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are set by the respondents in accord with average posterior probabilities, as
would be the case when beliefs are consistent with objective frequencies, then
the greatest changes in beliefs occur among low-risk individuals who learn they
are HIV-positive and high-risk individuals who learn they are HIV-negative.
This is because they were 'doing the wrong thing,' in terms of behavior based
on prior beliefs that turned out to be different from the truth.
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE
Table 4 examines the robustness of the 'difference-in-difference' results to
the addition of covariates to account for observed heterogeneity. The first and
third columns of Table 4 reproduce the 'difference-in-difference' estimates from
Table 3. The coefficients on what we will call the 'learning effects' (Rows 3 and
4) are the 'difference-in-difference' estimates from Table 3. Again, we see the
estimates that are greatest in magnitude are the Learn Negative effects for the
Homosexual group, and the Learn Positive effect for the Heterosexual group,
consistent with the theoretical model outlined in Section 2. However, only
the Learn Negative effect for the Homosexual group is statistically significant
(the large Learn Positive effect for Heterosexuals being identified off of only
8 individuals, as shown in Table 3). The bottom line from Table 4 is that
the addition of demographic indicators for race/ethnicity and age add little to
the explanatory power of the model (bear in mind the dependent variable is
differenced thus helping to account for the low R-squared of the regressions in

Table 4 and those presented below as well). In addition, in columns 3 and 6
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of Table 4 we include indicator variables for having 'low education' and 'low
income' and being covered by medical insurance to the model. Again the R
squared changes little, and the point estimates on the learning effects changes
negligibly.
However, the results in Table 4 may also be explained by some form of
unobserved heterogeneity. Since we lack randomization of individuals into a
'treatment' (offered the HIV test) and 'control' groups {a subset of the sampled
population from whom the offer of free, in-home HIV testing is withheld), we
will necessarily be subject to the criticism that our point estimates are biased
due to some form of selectivity. For example, in the present context, a plausible
explanation of our results, apart from any true 'learning' effect would be that
our control group which is composed of individuals who tested prior to the
survey, are a 'safer sex' group of people. The fact that they tested prior to the
survey is simply one dimension by which their attitudes toward risk manifest
themselves. In the ·race of a growing HIV epidemic, they may also be engaging in
o_ther dimensions of safer sex, such as reducing their number of sexual partners,
greater prophylactic usage when engaging in sexual contact, etc. As a result,
relative to our 'treatment' group, those who did not have an HIV test before the
survey, we may be subtracting off too large of a negative trend in the change
in the number of partners over time, thus generating the results we obtained in
Table 4, but which have nothing to do with the model we proposed to explain
those results. Unfortunately, the data set does not contain plausible instruments
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which could affect the desire to obtain an HIV test, but also meet the exclusion
restriction of not affecting the outcome of the change in the number of sexual
partners over the intervening 12 months. Thus, we present instead results based
on a second control group, which are qualitatively very similar to the results we
obtained in Tables 3 and 4, but slightly less statistically significant. Indeed,
earlier work based on different cuts of the data are also quite consistent with
the results shown here, indicating to us that the results we present here are
certainly representative of the overall pattern of results in the data.
We consider now this control group which consists of the considerable num
ber of people who filled out the questionnaire portion of the survey, but who
refused the blood test component of it (we call this group the Refusers). There
are 254 such people in our data who have completed the questionnaire, which
is roughly 14 percent of the overall sample. This group, as weU as those who
tested before the survey, should be unaffected by the 'treatment' of the HIV test
administered through the survey. However, they like those who tested before
the survey, are a non-random subset .of the overall sample, and so we are not
immune from arguments that our results here are also driven by self-selectivity.

While we acknowledge this potential flaw, we argue that unobserved hetero
geneity arguments like those presented in the previous paragraph would not
likely apply to this control group. In particular, it is difficult to see why those
individuals who refused an essentially free test (apart from the psychic costs of
testing), could be seen as a group exhibiting preferences toward 'safe sex' more
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so than those people in our treatment group. For this, and a variety of other
reasons, we report results based on this second control group in Table 5, which
indicate that qualitatively, the results from Tables 3 and 4 are robust.
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE
The 'learning' effects in Table 5 are again given by the interaction terms in
Rows 2 and 3. 22 We again see, as in Table 4, that the effect of learning one is HIV
positive for the homosexual respondents, leads to a slight decline in the change
· in the number of partners that is within one standard error of zero. Consistent
with the positive growth in the number of partners for the homosexuals who
learn through the survey they are HIV negative found in Table 4, we find a
positive effect using this second control group as well, although the magnitude
is about 60 percent of that in Table 4. The standard error is roughly the same,
and the t- statistics on these coefficients are roughly 1.5, which is insignificant
at conventual significance levels. However, the consistent pattern of the results
obtained from using both control groups, and given the rather small size of
the overall survey, lead us to conclude that the results in Table 5 are broadly
supportive of the results in Table 4.
22 Notice

that there is no main effect for HIV Positive in these regressions aa in Table 4, since

we do not have the HIV status for those respondents who refused the blood test administered
by the survey.
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4

Conclusion

Our results have important implications for the possible effects of public HIV
testing programs which would enhance the testing for IIIV either through sub
sidizing the cost of HIV testing or through requiring testing through certain
channels. Such programs are often proposed as an instrument to combat the
spread of HIV and AIDS. Proponents of these programs have in mind that those
who learn they are HIV-positive will take subsequent action so as to limit the
spread of the disease. Such an analysis, however, ignores the possibility that
individuals have private assessments of the probability that they are infected,
and that these prior beliefs help formulate their sexual practices and behavior.
If individuals who test through a public testing program are largely those in

dividuals who considered themselves to be likely carriers of HIV to begin with,
then the testing program may do little to alter their behavior. Such individu
als may well be better served through HIV awareness programs and education
programs oriented towards prevention, although that is an open question for
further research. These analyses also ignore the impact of testing on those in
dividuals who learn they are HIV negative. We found here a tendency for these
individuals to increase their number of sexual partners. This presents the possi
bility that a public testing program could perversely enhance the spread of HIV,
although we are not in a position to ascertain the likelihood of that happening.
In any event, the benefits of subsidized testing, in terms of significantly lowering
the amount of sexual contact for those who learn they are HIV positive, do not
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appear to be present in our data.
We take away from this particular exercise several lessons for future empirical
work attempting to directly observe information or its changes, and its impact
on market behavior.
First, in our case, while the change in information for different people in our
setting was observable, its impact was not. In particular, unless everyone in the
market has the same prior beliefs, the same change in information to two people
will result in different changes in behavior if they have different prior beliefs.
Thus, we still have to rely on the somewhat artificial device of resorting to
groupings of subpopulations to proxy for prior beliefs. In this case, since we are
dealing with prior beliefs of HIV infection, we point to the dramatic differences
in infection rates for homosexuals and heterosexuals, and use the proxy of sexual
orientation for the high and low prior probabilities of being HIV positive. Thus
future work needs to take into account that in situations where prior beliefs vary
over the population, simply having access to observable information changes is
not enough to avoid ad hoc assumptions in creating proxies. In short, this is
because the information treatment will be different for people with differing,
unobservable prior beliefs. Future work should try to identify settings where
priors are more homogeneous, or when they differ, where such differences can
be measured.
In addition, we recognize that in most markets stark differences in informa
tion changes, such as we have with people learning they are either HIV positive
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or negative (and nothing in between), are not discernable. For example, when
people apply for a bank loan a credit check can determine if they are 'good' or
'bad' risks, although a fail-safe test for such riskiness does not exist. Further
more, there are gradations of riskiness and it is not a simple binary indicator
as is the case with HIV status. Thus, empirical assessments which use some
measure of observable information need to take into account the reliability of
measurement device (which in our case is virtually 100 percent).
Finally, models of asymmetric information concern not just an individual
level change in an agent's information set, but also the degree to which that
information gets passed on to other agents in the market. Empirical assessments
ofsuch models need to try to measure directly the correlation between the change
in an individual's information set with the change in the market's perception
of that individual. Otherwise, only conclusions regarding whether the market
is best characterized by a pooling or a separating equilibrium appear to be
recoverable from only individual level data. In our setting, such assessments
could be made if we contacted our respondents' partners and surveyed them as
to whether or not they thought the respondent was HIV positive or negative. By
focusing attention on those respondents who learned their HIV status through
the survey, and seeing if their partners' beliefs as to their HIV status changed
as a result of the testing done through the survey, we could measure directly the
correlation of the partners' beliefs with the respondent's updates in HIV status.

In that case, we could make direct inferences as to the degree of asymmetric
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information in our setting by using direct measures of observable information.
We acknowledge, however, the parallel to other markets would be difficult to
carry out in practice.
There is, however, a difficulty with such a two-sided (i.e. sample the respon
dent and his or her partner(s)) sampling scheme. In contrast to the one-sided
sampling scheme used in collecting our data, where only the respondent was
sampled, with no identifiable link to his or her partner(s) (even though some of
them may have been sample participants as well), a two-sided sampling scheme
may run into incentive problems. In particular, if the respondent knows that
the survey is two-sided, and so the interviewers will be explicitly surveying the
people he names as his partners, he may have an incentive to respond in the
same way to the interviewer as he would to his partner's queries. In particular,
if he has lied to his partner, then two-sided sampling may create incentives for
him to lie to the interviewer as well, whereas one-sided sampling may not. Thus
there is the possibility of Hawthorne effects, whereby the sampling process it
self affects the population sampled, apart from the intervention of interest. In
devising surveys to capture the degree of asymmetric information in a mar
ket, we urge researchers to give careful consideration to the possibility of such
Hawthorne effects that may arise from direct two-sided sampling schemes.
Informational effects on markets are well characterized by a voluminous the
oretical literature. But empirical work on these models usually treats the infor
mation under question much like a residual in an econometric model, in that it is
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unoberved, but together with the independent variables, can be used to explain
the dependent variable completely. Unfortunately, for most explicit markets
we cannot construct a test (like an HIV test in our context) to yield a perfect
discrimination of each market trader's 'type'. But if surveys are designed for
the explicit purpose of testing these theoretical models, we can begin to amass
more direct evidence of the role that information imperfections play in deter
mining market behavior and market inefficiencies. 23 We are hopeful that the
sampling needs discussed briefly in this conclusion are helpful in the design of
such surveys and in their implementation.

23 For

example, the survey used in Ashenfelter and Krueger (1994), conducted at a twins

festival, was designed explicitly for estimating a return to schooling with unobserved family
components, and allowed for a correction to an exacerbated measurement error problem. The
survey was designed to sample directly 2 or 3 key components in the debate over the magnitude
of the economic return to schooling. In particular, through a rather clever survey design,
they could estimate a reliability ratio for measured schooling, a component not observable
with cross-section data (or even longitudinal data, except under strong assumptions). The
combination of these variables was not available in other datasets.
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Table 1
Com:earison of the means in the SFHHS and the US Po:eulation 1
Variable

SFHHS Sample Mean2

Male

0.47

0.55

Homosexual

0.14
(0. 35)

0.02 4

Age

30.0
(6. 79)
20-44

36.4

White

0.44

0.77

Black

0.25

0.13

Know HIV Status

0.22

HIV Positive

0.04

[Range:

Total Number of
Partners Wave 1

2.24
(1. 96)

Total Number of
Partners Wave 2

1.99
(1. 73)

Ever Use Condom
During Sex Wave 1

0.52

Ever Use Condom
During Sex Wave 2

0.59

Learn HIV Pas.

0.02

Learn HIV Neg.

0.76

Know HIV Pas.

0.03

Know HIV Neg.

0.19

Response
Rate
Number of obs.

NHSLS 3

18-59]

62%

80%

1110

3432

1 The US Population figures come from a random sample of American men and women
called the National Health and Social Life Survey (NHSLS) on sexuality conducted
by by Laumann, Gagnon, Michael and Michaels, at the University of Chicago, 1994.
2 Sample means as of the first wave, 1989, standard deviations for non-binary
variables are in parentheses.
3 These are the weighted means for the NHSLS sample given in their Appendix B.
4 In keeping with the definition from the UCSF, we use the response from the
NHSLS which is the "self-identification" response, rather than previous
experience with same gender sexual situations (this number would be about 5% had
we used that definition). In addition, using the Laumann et. al Table 8.2 we
compute that this figure is about 0.03 for men and women aged 18 to 39.
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Table 2A
Means for Treatment and Control Groups by Sexual Orientation

Variable

Number of Obs.

Learn
HIV+

Homosexual
Know
Refuse
HIV+
Test

Learn
HIV+
I

Heterosexual
Know
Refuse
HIV+
Test

II

14

31

44

Number of
Partners, Wave 1

3.14
(0.81)

4.42
{0.69)

1.93
(0.46)

Number of
Partners, Wave 2

2.29
(0.65)

3.97
(0.67)

Change in Number
of Partners

-0.86
(0.40)

White

3

210

3.60
(1. 69)

1.33
{0.67)

1.45
(0.11)

1.54
(0.34)

2.60
(0.68)

1.33
(0.67)

1.40
(0.10)

-0.45
(0.51)

-0.39
(0.38)

-1.00
(1. 52)

0.00
{1.15)

-0.05
(0.11)

0.79

0.68

0.66

0.40

0.33

0.30

Black

0.07

0.10

0.11

0.60

0.00

0.34

Hisp

0.07

0.13

0.11

0.00

0.67

0.25

31.0
{1. 68)

35.0
(0.94)

32.9
(0.84)

31.4
(2. 46)

34.7
(3.84)

29.3
(0 .47)

Low Education

0.29

0.13

0.09

0.06

1.00

0.30

Low Income

0.43

0.29

0.27

0.04

1.00

0.58

Medical Insurance

1.00

0.97

0.93

0.80

0.67

0.85

Age

Notes:

5

Standard errors for the non-binary variables are in parentheses.
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Tabl.e 2B

Means for Treatment and Control Groups by Sexual Orientation

Variable

Learn
HIV -

Homosexual
Know
Refuse
HIV Test
HIV -

67

44

44

Number of
Partners, Wave 1

0.79
(0.22)

2.70
(0.49)

Number of
Partners, Wave 2

0.90
(0.25)

Change in Number
of Partners

Number of Obs.

I
I
I
I

Learn
HIV -

Heterosexual
Know
Refuse
HIV HIV 'lest

747

252

210

1.93
(0.46)

1.66
(0.06)

1.89
(0.11)

1.45
(0.11)

2.00
(0.41)

1.54
(0.34)

1.53
(0.06)

1.65
(0.11)

1.40
(0.10)

0.10
(0.16)

-0.70
(0.31)

-0.39
(0.38)

-0.13
(0.06)

-0.23
(0.10)

-0.05
(0.11)

White

0.73

0.80

0.66

0.42

0.44

0.30

Black

0.12

0.07

0.11

0.26

0.23

0.34

Hisp

0.10

0.07

0.11

0.24

0.26

0.25

31.0
(0.75)

33.3
(0.84)

32.9
(0.84)

29.5
(0.25)

29.9
(0.42)

29.3
(0.47)

Low Education

0.15

0.09

0.09

0.37

0.38

0.30

Low Income

O. 49 · ·

0.43

0.27

0.65

0.63

0.58

Medical Insurance

0.97

0.93

0.93

0.85

0.85

0.85

Age

Notes:

Standard errors for the non-binary variables are in parentheses.
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Table 3
The Effect of Subsidized Testing on
the Change in the Number of Sexual Partners

Total Partners Wave 2 - Total Partners Wave 1
Homosexual

Heterosexual

-0.86
(0.40)
(14)

-1.00
(1.52)
(5)

0.10
(0.16)
(67]

-0 .13
(0.06)
(747)

-0.45
(0.51)
(31]

0.00
(1.15)
[3]

-0.70
(0.31)
(44]

-0.23
(0.10)
(252]

-0.41
(0.65)

-1.00
(1. 91)

0.80
(0.35)

(0.11)

Uncertain
HIV status
before the survey
Learn:
HIV Positive

HIV Negative
Known
HIV status
before the survey
Know:
HIV Positive

HIV Negative

noifference-in-Differen cesn
Estimate of the Effect
of Public Testing:
Learn:
HIV Positive
HIV Negative

0.10

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses,_and number of observations for each
cell are in brackets.
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Table 4
Regressions For the Effects of Subsidized Testing on the
Change in the Total Number of Partners:
(Uses those who know their HJ:V status prior to the survey as the control group)

Dependent Variable=
Total Partners Wave 2 - Total Partners Wave 1
Independent
Variable

(1)

Homosexual
(3)
(2)

(4)

Heterosexual
(5)
(6)

Intercept

-0.70
(0.29)

2.33
(4. 83)

1.13
(5.03)

-0.23
(0.10)

-2.34
(i.10)

-2.45
(1.14)

HIV Positive

0.25
(0.45)

0.20
(0.46)

0.24
(0 .47)

0.23
(0.90)

0.22
( 0. 90)

0.16
(0.90)

Learn HIV Pos.
(Learn*HIV Pos.)

-0.41
(0.62)

-0.34
(0.64)

-0.37
(0 .65)

-1.00
(1.13)

-1.04
( 1.13)

-0.98
(1.14)

Learn HIV Neg.
(Learn*HIV Neg.)

0.81
(0.37)

0.83
(0.39)

0.84
(0.39)

0.11
(0 .11)

0 .11
(0.11)

0.11
(0.11)

White

-0.41
(0.65)

-0.40
(0.65)

-0.27
(0 .20)

-0.26
(0 .20)

Black

-0.54
(0.80)

-0.68
(0.82)

-0.06
(0.21)

-0.09
(0 .21)

Hisp

-0.20
(0.80)

-0.26
(0.82)

-0.06
(0 .21)

-0.08
(0 .21)

Age

-0.19
(0 .29)

-0.14
(0 .29)

0.16
(0.07)

0.16
(0.07)

Age Squared
(x 10)

0.03
(0.04)

0.03
(0.04)

-0.03
(0.01)

-0.03
(0.01)

Low Education

0.18
(0.49)

0.06
(0.12)

Low Income

0.43
(0.35)

0.05
(0.11)

Medical Insurance

-0.06
(0.86)

-0.06
( 0 .15)

R-Squared
Number of
Observations
Note:

0.04

0.05

156

156

0. 06- ·
156

Standard errors are in parentheses.
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0.002

0.01

0.01

1007

1006

1006

Table 5
Regressio ns For the Effects of Subsidize d Testing on the
Change in the Total Number of Partners:
(Uses those who refuse the H:rv test through the survey as the control group)

Dependent Variable =
Total Partners Wave 2 - Total Partners Wave 1
Independe nt
Variable

(1)

Homosexu al
(2)
(3)

(4)

Heterosex ual
(5)
(6)

Intercept

-0.39
{O .28)

1. 95 .
{4. 97)

1.08
{5.07)

-0.05
{0.11)

-3.44
{1.13)

-1.41
{1.37)

Learn HIV Pas.
{Learn*HI V Pos.)

-0.47
(0.57)

-0.41
(0.58)

-0.58
(0 .60)

-0.95
(0. 70)

-1.04
( 1.13)

-0.95
(0. 70)

·Learn HIV Neg.
(Learn*HIV Neg.)

0.49
(0.36)

0.57
(0.37)

0.54
(0.38)

-0.08
(0.12)

0.11
(0.11)

-0.03
(0.12)

White

-0.59
(0.67)

-0.55
(0.67)

-0.27
(0.20)

-0.42
(0 .20)

Black

-0.61
(0.81)

-0.88
(0.82)

-0.06
(0.21)

-0.09
(0 .20)

Hisp

-0.69
{0.83)

-0.75
(0.84)

-0.06
(0.21)

0.01
(0 .21)

Age

-0.15
(0.31)

-0.10
(0.31)

0.16
(0.07)

0.23
(0.08)

Age Squared
(x 10)

0.03
(0.05)

0.02
(0.05)

-0.03
(0.01)

-0.04
(0.01)

Low Education

0.87
(0.54)

-0.06
(0.12)

Low Income

0.00
(0.37)

0.09
(0.12)

Medical Insurance

-0.08
(0.92)

0.23
(0.15)

R-Squared
Number of
Observati ons
Note:

0.03

0.05

0.07

0.002

125

125

125

962

Standard errors are in parenthes es.
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0.02

0.03

961

961

